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This paper makes two main contributions. First, we examine the long-run effect of foreign aid on domestic output for 59 
developing countries using heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques to control for omitted variable and 
endogeneity bias and to detect possible cross-country differences in the output effect of aid. The main result is that aid 
has, on average, a negative long-run effect on output, but there are large differences across countries (in about a third of 
cases the effect is positive). Second, we use a general-to-specific variable selection approach to systematically search 
for country-specific factors explaining the cross-country differences in the estimated long-run effect of aid. In contrast 
to previous studies, we find that aid effectiveness does not depend primarily on factors such as the quality of economic 
policy, the share of a country’s area that is in the tropics, the level of democracy or political stability. The results 
suggest that the cross-country heterogeneity in the output effect of aid can be explained mainly by cross-country 
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1. Introduction 
Aid financing, and the policy reform conditions typically associated with aid, is the 
cornerstone of international development strategies. Developing countries, especially the poorest, 
have insufficient domestic resources to finance their investment and development needs, while rich 
countries have a desire to assist countries that are less well off; aid serves these purposes as rich 
donors provide concessional finance to poor countries. The core premise is that such aid is effective 
in contributing to economic growth and development. This premise appears to be accepted at a 
global political level. The 2002 Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, and 
the 2005 G-8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, endorsed commitments by rich countries to increase 
the amount of foreign aid significantly, especially to Africa. In the same vein, the Report of the 
Commission for Africa (2005) advocated a doubling of aid to Africa. These commitments are often 
reiterated, such as at the L’Aquila Summit in 2009. There appears to be a political belief in the 
effectiveness of aid, although skeptics could counter that it is merely rhetoric as the commitments 
have not been fully met. This suggests a prior question to investigate: is there evidence that aid is 
related to output (thus growth) over time on average? This is one question addressed here. 
A large literature on aid effectiveness has attempted to provide empirical evidence without 
reaching any consensus (sketched below). However, this literature based on cross-country or panel 
growth regressions suffers from many limitations: failure to account for country heterogeneity in 
aid effects over time; using growth as the dependent variable but levels as independent variables; 
and the endogeneity problem with weak instruments. Furthermore, it is unclear which factors 
among the potentially important determinants of growth (explanatory or control variables) are really 
important for aid effectiveness. Different studies suggest different variables but rarely have there 
been rigorous attempts to test these against each other. Consequently, there is uncertainty about 
which variables act, in fact, as empirically important conditioning variables for the effect of aid in 
promoting growth. This paper attempts to overcome some of these problems by making three 
contributions:  
(1) Heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques, that are robust to omitted variables and 
endogenous regressors, are employed to examine the long-run effect of foreign aid on domestic 
output for 59 developing countries over the period 1971 to 2003 — both for the sample as a 
whole and for each country individually (demonstrating heterogeneity). Accordingly, in 
contrast to previous studies, the level of output rather than the growth rate of output is used as 
the dependent variable.   3
(2) Having estimated the long-run response of output to aid for each country, a variable selection 
approach (based on a general-to-specific methodology to identify from a large number of 
potentially relevant variables those that are the important factors) is employed to explain the 
cross-country differences in the long-run effect of aid on output.  
(3) A methodological contribution of this paper is to use a two-step estimation procedure that 
combines panel and cross-section methods. The first step involves estimating the long-run 
effect of aid on output for each country using heterogeneous panel estimators. The second step 
involves estimating the determinants of aid effectiveness using cross-section regressions with 
the estimated output effect from the first stage as the dependent variable. The aim is to identify 
which country-specific factors are empirically important determinants of long-run aid 
effectiveness. 
The paper contributes to understanding of the determinants of aid effectiveness whilst 
avoiding many of the specification and estimation debates that plague the existing literature. A 
considerable amount of empirical research since the 1970s has addressed aspects of aid 
effectiveness (see Hansen and Tarp, 2000) without producing a consensus; rather, views appear 
quite polarized. Studies such as Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004), Collier and Dollar (2004) find 
that aid itself has no effect on growth, although when interacted with policy there is a conditional 
effect; aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with a good policy environment. Others find 
that this result is not robust so aid is insignificant irrespective of policy (e.g., Easterly et al., 2004) 
or find evidence for a positive, albeit small in magnitude, effect of aid on growth even allowing for 
conditioning on policy (e.g., Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Daalgard et al., 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 
2001). There are now numerous studies of aid effectiveness with conflicting results; the majority of 
studies find that aid has a small, conditional positive effect on growth, but there is considerable 
disagreement on which conditional factors are most important (Morrissey, 2006). 
As these studies are based on cross-country econometric growth regressions, it should not be 
surprising that they yield mixed results. Growth is a complex process that is difficult to explain and 
aid is only one of many factors that may influence growth; many other factors are potentially 
important (hence candidates as conditioning variables) for some, but not necessarily all, countries. 
Furthermore, aid can take many different forms, some of which (e.g. financing for investment) are 
more likely to have a medium term impact on growth than others, such as technical assistance and 
humanitarian relief. More importantly, although the empirical aid literature has provided valuable 
insights into whether and how aid may promote growth, it suffers from the limitations inherent in 
cross-country growth regressions.   4
Cross-country (panel) regression models, by definition, are not able to capture the 
heterogeneity in the relationship between aid and growth across countries, and the estimates may be 
seriously biased in the presence of such heterogeneity. Several country-specific factors may induce 
apparent differences in the effect of aid on growth, but these factors cannot be fully controlled for in 
cross-country regressions (especially if effectively unobservable); the classical omitted variables 
problem. Panel estimation can account for unobserved country-specific effects, but the 
homogeneous panel estimators used in the aid literature produce inconsistent and potentially 
misleading estimates of the average values of the parameters in dynamic models when the slope 
coefficients differ across cross-section units (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). 
Another (closely related) problem with the cross-country approach used in the majority of 
studies is the potential endogeneity of aid. Aid may go to countries that have just experienced 
natural disasters or severe economic shocks, which could explain a negative correlation between aid 
and growth. Alternatively, to the extent that donors reward economically successful countries with 
increased aid one might see a positive correlation between aid and growth, which again would not 
reflect a causal effect. The recent literature attempts to control for this endogeneity problem through 
instrumental variable methods. However, it is well known that instrumental variables regressions 
may lead to spurious results when the instruments are weak or invalid and it is also well known that 
it is difficult (and sometimes even impossible) to find variables that qualify as valid instruments 
(Temple, 1999). This does not mean one must reject the empirical results (it does help to explain the 
mixed evidence), but implies that results must be interpreted with caution. 
  A further methodological problem with both cross-country and panel studies is the use of the 
growth rate of output as the dependent variable while the level of the aid/GDP ratio of the recipient 
country is used as the explanatory variable. Growth rates show, in general, very little persistence 
over time, whereas the aid/GDP ratio has exhibited persistent movements with positive and/or 
negative trends for most developing countries since the 1960s. The empirical implication is that 
there cannot be a long-run relationship between the growth rate of output and the level of the 
aid/GDP ratio over time; such unbalanced data (with stationary and nonstationary variables) can, 
even in cross-country analyses, lead to misleading results (Ericsson et al., 2001). In addition, and 
equally important, several recent contributions to the theoretical growth literature focus on levels 
instead of growth rates (e.g., Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review to 
identify the potential ways in which foreign aid can affect domestic output. Section 3 sets out the 
empirical specification to estimate the long-run effect of aid on output and discusses the data.   5
Section 4 presents the estimates of the long-run effect of aid on output. Section 5 contains the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of the estimated long-run aid effectiveness. Section 6 
concludes with a discussion of the results. 
 
2. How Can Foreign Aid Affect Domestic Output? 
The recent aid effectiveness literature starts from a standard growth model; as aid is not a 
variable in such models, it is introduced as a component of investment (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 
Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). The assumption is that in a reduced form context aid finances the 
investment that determines growth. The potential effect of aid on domestic output can be 
represented in an aggregate production function of the form: 
θ
t t t K B Y = ,                                                                                                                             (1) 
where  t Y  is output,  t K  is the capital stock, and  t B  is a productivity parameter. For simplicity, 
assume that capital depreciates fully each period, so that the end-of-period capital stock is equal to 
domestic investment,  t t I K = . Assuming further that domestic investment is the aggregate of public 
and private investment and that public investment is financed by taxes and foreign aid (since aid is 
primarily given to the government), the production function can be written as:   
θ φ ) ( t t t t t Iprivate A Itax B Y + + = ,                                                                                          (2) 
where  t Itax  is tax-financed public investment,  t A  represents foreign aid, φ  is the share of aid that 
is used for public investment purposes, and  t Iprivate  is private investment. Equation (2) now shows 
succinctly how aid can affect output: it can directly increase output (if  0 > φ ), and it may also 
influence output indirectly by affecting the amount of tax-financed public investment, the volume of 
private investment, and the level of productivity. 
Accordingly, the direct effect of aid depends on how much of aid is invested by the 
government. It is common in the literature to assume that aid is intended to finance investment so 
that if aid is redirected to government consumption (fungibility) this reduces effectiveness, the 
direct effect on domestic output (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000). This, however, is misleading as 
government consumption includes expenditures to ‘maintain and operate’ investment projects, 
especially in social sectors. Public investment spending is mostly construction costs, whereas the 
recurrent costs essential for productive investment are included as consumption. Furthermore, a 
large proportion of aid is not intended to finance capital investment, so the fungibility argument is   6
generally misguided. Donors direct much of their aid to social sectors (consumption spending that 
could be considered as investment in human capital) or technical assistance (which may contribute 
to capacity building and aggregate productivity, although much of this aid is actually spent in the 
donor rather than the recipient). In a reduced form context, the primary issue is not what class of 
spending the aid is allocated to but the type of investment (if any) it supports as this determines the 
expected lag before any impact on output should be observed. 
Two issues arise, one relating to how aid is measured and the other to the treatment of 
investment. Studies following Burnside and Dollar (2000) use standard measures of total aid, so no 
attempt is made to identify aid that is directed at investment, and typically omit any investment 
variable from the estimated model on the basis that some portion of investment is directly financed 
by aid. This imposes the assumption that aid is a proxy for investment; this is problematic because 
not all aid finances investment and not all investment is financed by aid, and the respective shares 
will vary across countries and over time.
1  
Even if aid is fully invested, it may or may not increase output. The inflow of aid will affect 
government decisions on expenditure, tax effort and even borrowing — phenomena widely 
recognized in the theoretical and empirical literature on the fiscal consequences of foreign aid 
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004) — which may in turn affect the levels of public and private 
sector investment, and thereby output. Many effects are possible and the net impact on output is an 
empirical matter that is likely to vary from country to country (and over time).  
Foreign aid can affect output through the level of productivity in at least four ways. First, 
assuming that productivity is determined (inter alia) by the quality of institutions, aid may affect 
productivity through effects on institutions. As with investment, the direction of any net effect is far 
from obvious. While many studies find that aid is associated with weak institutions and low 
productivity (e.g. Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007), deep endogeneity 
implies severe caution in drawing inferences from such studies; it may simply reflect the tendency 
of aid to go to poorer countries (with weaker institutions). In contrast, aid that supports capacity-
building, improved public sector management and policy reform could have a (perhaps gradual) 
effect of increasing the quality of governance and institutions. Second, and related, aid can affect 
productivity if it encourages diversion of resources from productive activities to unproductive rent 
                                                           
1 Gomanee et al. (2005b) address this concern explicitly by including in the measure of aid only those forms that 
finance physical or human capital investment and by removing from the measure of public investment the proportion 
that is explained by aid. In a regression with aid and investment that is not aid-financed, they find that both have a 
positive impact on growth for a sub-Saharan African sample and that the small magnitude of aid effectiveness is largely 
explained by very low productivity of investment.   7
seeking; here the focus is on corruption or even conflict rather than institutions more generally. 
Again, distinguishing cause and effect, and attributing a causal role to aid, is difficult.
2 One should 
certainly caution against generalizations. Third, aid can reduce the productivity of an economy 
through Dutch Disease effects, if aid reduces the competitiveness of the more productive tradable 
goods sector and thus results in a reallocation of resources towards the less productive non-tradable 
goods sector. The empirical evidence for Dutch Disease effects of aid is inconclusive, and it is quite 
possible that aid may generate positive externalities for the tradable sector (see Adam and 
O’Connell, 2004). Finally, aid can cause an increase in productivity by relaxing the binding foreign 
exchange constraint and allowing the country to increase its imports of capital goods. Capital goods 
imports from high-income countries are typically associated with higher productivity in developing 
countries, since capital goods embody technological know-how (e.g. Almeida and Fernandes, 
2008).  
In summary, the effect of foreign aid on domestic output is theoretically ambiguous and 
depends on several factors, the most important of which are effects on the level and productivity of 
investment. Institutional factors are clearly important, but it is not unreasonable to assume that these 
largely influence the productivity of investment, howsoever financed. Furthermore, institutions tend 
to display strong persistence within countries over time. It follows that the effect of aid on output 
may differ significantly from country to country, and that the output effect of aid may change over 
time. These issues will be addressed empirically in the analysis that follows. 
  
3. Empirical Specification: Aid, Investment and Output 
The analysis will examine the long-run effect of foreign aid on domestic output using 
heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques to control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias 
and to detect possible cross-country differences in the long-run output effect of aid. This section 
presents the basic empirical model and the data. 
It is common practice in panel cointegration studies to estimate a bivariate long-run 
relationship (see Herzer, 2008). However, this would be inappropriate for aid given the discussion 
in the preceding section. It would not be reasonable to assume, or estimate as if, aid is the major 
determinant of output. However, as it is necessary to employ a very parsimonious specification, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that investment is a primary determinant of output over time, and aid is 
                                                           
2 Maren (1997), for example, argues that Somalia’s civil war was caused by the desire of different factions to control 
the large amount of food aid the country was receiving. However, the country needed food aid because of inherent 
(prior) economic and political governance weaknesses.   8
the element of investment of particular concern. Moreover, since investment may act as a proxy for 
a number of unobservable time-varying factors that can affect both aid allocation decisions and 
output, it should be included in the analysis to control for omitted variable bias.
3 Thus, we consider 
a model of the form: 
it it it i i it I A t a Y ε β β δ + + + + = 2 1 ,                                                                                          (3) 
where  it Y  is the log of real GDP (the output measure) over time periods  T t , ... , 2 , 1 =  and countries 
N i , ... , 2 , 1 = . Given that it is not possible to identify the proportion of aid that actually finances 
investment, nor the amount of investment that is not financed by aid,  it A  is represented by the 
standard measure of aid — the percentage share of net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
GDP, and it I  is total investment as a share of GDP.
4 The β  coefficients represent the cross-country 
average of the effects of aid and investment on GDP respectively, which are allowed to be country 
specific and thus to vary across countries. Moreover, we include country-specific fixed effects,  i a , 
and country-specific deterministic time trends,  t i δ , to control for any country-specific omitted 
factors that are relatively stable over time or evolve smoothly over time. Data on both GDP and aid 
come from the World Development Indicators 2009 database,
5 while the investment data are from 
the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) Penn World Table. These measures are imperfect but can be 
interpreted as the effect of aid on output given investment. 
  An important feature of equation (3) is the assumption that, in the long-run, permanent 
changes in the aid/GDP ratio and the investment/GDP ratio are associated with permanent changes 
in the log-level of GDP. Econometrically, this implies that the individual time series for aid 
(relative to GDP), investment (relative to GDP) and GDP (in logs) must exhibit unit-root behavior 
and that  it A  and it I  must be cointegrated with  it Y .  Details of the unit root tests are in Appendix 
A1; the result is a panel of 59 countries ( 59 = N ) for which  it A , it I , and  it Y  behave as random 
walks, with data from 1971 to 2003 ( 33 = T ).  
  
 
                                                           
3 The parameter for the effect of investment on output may act as a proxy for unobservable country-specific factors. 
4 As the levels of aid and investment are both included in GDP (by accounting convention), using levels would create a 
problem as effectively the explanatory variables are part of the independent variable. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
deflate aid and investment; dividing by GDP seems appropriate to give a measure of the relative importance of the 
levels. 
5 Aid as a share of GDP was calculated by multiplying aid per capita (in current US dollars) by population and dividing 
by GDP (in current US dollars).   9
Table 1 Countries and country summary statistics  
 
Average 







GDP ratio   
Average 








Algeria  24.41 0.60 17.80  Liberia  20.35  21.62 6.19 
Belize  19.77 6.68 14.84  Madagascar  21.86 8.38  4.18 
Benin  21.04  9.63  10.06  Malawi  20.85 17.94 10.31 
Bolivia  22.53 6.45 10.07  Malaysia  24.37 0.45 24.05 
Botswana  21.48 6.88 22.21  Mali  21.22  16.39 9.12 
Burkina  Faso  21.12 12.64 10.43  Mauritania  20.49 21.86 14.55 
Burundi  20.31  16.13 4.90  Morocco  23.93 2.72 13.83 
Cameroon 22.73  4.05  6.18  Nicaragua  21.956  12.98  10.01 
Cent. African Rep.  20.50  12.11  9.36  Niger  21.13  12.96  7.87 
Chad  20.75 11.76 10.21  Nigeria  24.21  0.49  7.24 
Chile  24.36 0.20 18.39  Pakistan  24.41 3.00 12.92 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  22.58 6.97  9.09  Panama  22.73 1.05 19.17 
Congo, Rep.  21.54  6.14  22.13  Papua N. Guinea  21.57  11.63  8.58 
Costa  Rica  22.92 1.77  9.93  Peru  24.43 1.05 17.07 
Cote  d’Ivoire  22.82 4.23  6.98  Philippines  24.66 1.48 15.78 
Dominican  Rep.  23.10 1.20 12.37  Rwanda  21.09  18.16 3.01 
Ecuador  23.20 1.15 21.49  Senegal  21.92 9.74  5.71 
Egypt  24.68 6.44  8.14  Sierra  Leone  20.59  13.19 4.10 
El  Salvador  22.97 4.20  8.31  Solomon  Islands  19.07  22.79 8.59 
Gabon  22.13 2.13  9.26  South  Korea  26.08 0.41 33.60 
Gambia  19.39  19.81 7.82  Sri  Lanka  22.89 5.71 14.77 
Ghana  21.90 6.97  5.73  Sudan  22.69 5.38 13.28 
Guatemala 23.26  1.45  8.01  Swaziland  20.462  5.19  11.91 
Honduras  22.09 6.78 14.21  Syria  23.15 4.88  8.81 
India  26.18 0.76 11.65  Thailand  24.80 0.74 31.05 
Indonesia  25.18 1.50 18.48  Togo  20.70 9.67 11.32 
Jamaica  22.59 2.94 16.94  Tunisia  23.11 2.68 18.68 
Kenya  22.86 6.34 12.53  Uruguay  23.46 0.30 14.37 
Lesotho  20.02 17.44 20.64  Zambia  21.79 13.91 16.29 
      Zimbabwe 22.43  3.05  14.16 
 
Table 1 lists the countries along with the average values for  it Y ,  it A , and  it I  over the period 
from 1971 to 2003. As expected, there are large cross-country differences in the values of these 
parameters. Investment accounts for more than 30 percent of GDP in South Korea and Thailand, 
while several countries, such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Madagascar, are characterized by 
extremely low investment rates of about 4 percent. Also striking are the differences in the average 
aid/GDP ratios. The Solomon Islands is the most aid-dependent economy, with aid amounting to 
more than 22 percent of GDP, followed by Mauritania, Liberia, Gambia, Rwanda, Malawi, Lesotho, 
Mali, and Burundi. All these countries have an average ratio of aid to GDP of more than 15 percent, 
whereas in Chile, Uruguay, South Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Algeria, Thailand, and India aid 
accounts for less than 1 percent of GDP. Interestingly, in many countries (Liberia, Rwanda, 
Solomon Islands, Gambia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Madagascar,   10
Senegal, Papua New Guinea, Nicaragua, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Chad, and 
Ghana), the aid/GDP ratio is greater than the investment/GDP ratio, suggesting that a large part of 
aid is used for consumption rather than investment, at least in these countries. Moreover, countries 
with higher GDP tend to have lower aid/GDP ratios, and vice versa. India, South Korea, and 
Thailand, for example, are among the largest economies and the least aid-dependent countries in our 
sample. The Solomon Islands, in contrast, is the country with the lowest GDP and the highest share 
of aid in GDP. 
Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix plot  it Y ,  it A , and  it I  for the period from 1971 to 2003. As 
can be seen from Figure A1, GDP increased in all countries, with the exception of Liberia (row 4, 
column 6) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (row 3, column 4) where GDP declined between 
1971 and 2003. Noteworthy are also Sierra Leone (row 6, column 7) and Rwanda (row 6, column 
5): in Sierra Leone, GDP showed an increasing trend until 1991; fell from 1991 to 1999, and then 
rose sharply from 1999 to 2003. Similarly, Rwanda’s GDP rose from 1971 to 1991, dropped 
abruptly between 1991 and 1994 (note that this preceded the genocide), and then rose rapidly from 
1994 to 2003. Thus, a characteristic feature of the evolution of GDP in most developing countries is 
volatility; that is, GDP increased but not steadily. This instability is even more characteristic of aid 
and investment. Figures A2 and A3 show that  it A  and  it I  exhibit positive and/or negative trends as 
well as strong deviations from these trends. Overall, the time-series evolution is consistent with the 
possibility that  it Y ,  it A , and  it I  are nonstationary and cointegrated, which is also confirmed by 
several panel-unit root and panel cointegration tests reported in Appendices A1 and A2. 
 
4. Panel Cointegration Results 
The long-run effect of aid on GDP is estimated using the between-dimension group-mean 
panel DOLS estimator that Pedroni (2000, 2001) argues has a number of advantages over the 
within-dimension approach. First, it allows for greater flexibility in the presence of heterogeneous 
cointegrating vectors, whereas under the within-dimension approach the cointegrating vectors are 
constrained to be the same for each country. Second, the point estimates provide a more useful 
interpretation in the case of heterogeneous cointegrating vectors, as they can be interpreted as the 
mean value of the cointegrating vectors, which does not apply to the within estimators. Third, 
between-dimension estimators suffer from much lower small-sample size distortions than is the case 
with the within-dimension estimators. 
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,                                                                  (4) 
where Φ1ij and Φ2ij are coefficients of lead and lag differences which account for possible serial 
correlation and endogeneity of the regressors. Thus, an important feature of the DOLS procedure is 
that it generates unbiased estimates for variables that cointegrate even with endogenous regressors. 
Consequently, in contrast to cross-section and conventional panel approaches, the approach does 
not require exogeneity assumptions nor does it require the use of instruments. In addition, the 
group-mean panel DOLS estimator is superconsistent under cointegration, and is robust to the 


















ˆ β β                                                                                                                    (6) 
is the corresponding t-statistic of  m β ˆ  (m = 1, 2) and  mi β ˆ  is the conventional time-series DOLS 
estimator applied to the ith country of the panel. Stock and Watson (1993) find that this estimator 
performs well in small samples (as here) compared with other cointegration estimators.  
The DOLS procedure is applied to both the raw data and to data that have been demeaned 
over the cross-sectional dimension; that is, in place of  it Y ,  it A , and  it I , we also use 
t it it Y Y Y − = ' , 
t it it A A A − = ' , and 
t it it I I I − = ' , where 
t Y  =  ∑ =
− N
i it Y N 1
1 , 
t A  =  ∑ =
− N
i it A N 1
1 , and 
t I  =  ∑ =
− N
i it I N 1
1 ,                                                                                                                   (7) 
to account for cross-sectional dependence due to common shocks or spillovers among countries at 
the same time. The estimates are reported in Table 2. As can be seen, the unadjusted and demeaned   12
data produce similar results. The coefficients on Iit are highly significant and positive, as expected, 
whereas the coefficients on Ait are highly significant and negative. More precisely, the demeaned 
data yield an aid coefficient of -0.0081, implying that, in the long-run, a one percentage point 
increase in the aid-to-GDP ratio leads to a decrease in GDP by 0.0081 percent.  
 
Table 2 DOLS estimates of the coefficients on aid and investment 
  Ait  Iit 
Unadjusted data  -0.0064** (-6.64)  0.0235** (16.96) 
Demeaned data  -0.0081** (-9.38)  0.0170** (15.80) 
Notes: The dependent variable is Yit. ** indicate significance at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. The number of 
leads and lags in the individual DOLS regressions was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a maximum of three 
lags. 
 
Appendix A3 presents a set of sensitivity analysis demonstrating that the negative effect of 
aid on output is not due to individual outliers, sample-selection bias (if a group of countries in a 
particular region have a significant effect) or the time period, and that the results are similar using 
private investment data in place of total investment (albeit for a smaller sample). However, it is 
worth explicitly considering if the results are robust to alternative estimation techniques. For this 
purpose, a conditional error-correction model is used, regressing  it Y Δ , on  1 − it Y ,  1 − it A , and  1 − it I , the 
first differences of  it A  and  it I , the lagged first differences of  it A ,  it I , and  it Y , individual time 
trends, and individual intercepts.
6 Computing the group-mean coefficients (and t-statistics), yields 
the following equation (** (*) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level, t-statistics in parentheses): 
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                              (8) 
The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable,  1 − it Y , is negative and highly significant; 
normalizing on  it Y , yields the following significant long-run relationship: 
it it i i it I A t a Y 0132 . 0 0080 . 0 + − + = δ .                                                                                    (9) 
                                                           
6 We use the demeaned data to account for the likely cross-sectional dependence through common time effects.   13
As the estimated aid coefficient is almost identical to the result of the DOLS procedure, it can be 
concluded that the negative long-run effect of aid on output is robust to different estimation 
techniques. Thus, the results appear to be robust to potential outliers, sample selection, the 
specification of the empirical model, the sample period, and different estimation techniques. This 
negative effect for the sample as a whole does not, however, imply that aid exerts a negative effect 
on GDP in each individual country. 
 
Table 3 DOLS country estimates and stability tests  
Country  Ait  t-stat  MeanF  Country  Ait  t-stat  MeanF 
Algeria -0.0682**  -2.54  7.49*  Liberia -0.0311**  -5.46  0.94 
Belize 0.0267  0.78  5.88  Madagascar  -0.0339  -0.70  2.34 
Benin -0.0118  -0.80  3.62  Malawi  -0.0028  -1.23  1.12 
Bolivia -0.0720**  -4.93  1.62  Malaysia  0.0157  1.51  14.48** 
Botswana -0.0344**  -5.13  24.25**  Mali  -0.0277**  -4.11  4.18 
Burkina Faso  0.0050  0.94  7.26*  Mauritania  -0.0012  -1.13  1.06 
Burundi 0.0453**  4.91  0.80  Morocco  -0.0209**  -4.00  3.08 
Cameroon -0.0184  -0.94  2.59  Nicaragua  -0.0088**  -3.50  4.85 
Central African Rep.  -0.0039  -0.59  0.53  Niger  -0.032**  -7.20  0.55 
Chad 0.0457*  2.17  3.15  Nigeria  -0.0380  -2.00  3.06 
Chile  0.0592** 3.65  2.88  Pakistan  -0.0393**  -10.35 0.97 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  0.0769** 3.30  3.86  Panama  -0.0612  -1.12 6.69* 
Congo, Rep.  -0.0548**  -5.79  2.95  Papua New Guinea  -0.0019  -0.18  15.98** 
Costa Rica  -0.0681**  -3.44  5.58  Peru  0.0416**  3.72  3.83 
Cote d’Ivoire  -0.0153**  -3.08  0.80  Philippines  0.0194*  2.39  4.33 
Dominican  Republic 0.0283** 5.83  3.04  Rwanda  -0.0209**  -4.42 6.43* 
Ecuador -0.0297**  -7.36  3.86  Senegal -0.0362*  -2.74  1.44 
Egypt -0.0303**  -3.52  1.21  Sierra  Leone  -0.0560*  -2.70  2.27 
El Salvador  -0.0473**  -4.27  26.21**  Solomon Islands  -0.0434**  -3.10  4.65 
Gabon  0.0429 0.80 1.48  South  Korea  0.0057  0.18 5.80 
Gambia 0.0012  1.20  1.56  Sri  Lanka  -0.0259*  -2.17  0.43 
Ghana -0.0023  -0.11  1.94  Sudan  -0.0244*  -2.27  6.88* 
Guatemala 0.0741*  2.99  4.44  Swaziland  -0.0405**  -4.18  3.43 
Honduras -0.0152*  -2.12  3.41  Syria  0.0096  1.80  2.85 
India 0.0181  1.39  7.94*  Thailand  0.0333  0.63  8.66** 
Indonesia -0.0390  -1.39  3.08  Togo  -0.0007  -0.09  5.69 
Jamaica -0.0343**  -11.19  0.74  Tunisia  -0.0052*  -2.15  0.88 
Kenya  0.0336**  8.67 4.46  Uruguay  0.0116  1.27 4.19 
Lesotho  0.0006 0.27 1.44  Zambia  0.0007  0.36 1.83 
       Zimbabwe  0.0229  1.21  8.50* 
Notes: The number of leads and lags was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a maximum of three lags. MeanF is 
a Chow-type test for parameter constancy in cointegrating regressions. The 5% (1%) critical value for the stability test 
(MeanF) is 6.22 (8.61) (Hansen, 1992). ** (*) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
The individual country DOLS point estimates of the output effect of aid are presented in 
Table 3. The most striking feature of these estimates is the heterogeneity in the coefficients, ranging 
from -0.072 in Bolivia to 0.077 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus, although the long-run   14
effect of aid on GDP is negative in general or on average in developing countries, aid does not have 
a negative long-run effect on GDP in all countries. More precisely, for 37 out of 59 countries (and 
thus in 63 percent of cases) an increase in aid is associated with a decrease in GDP, while in 22 
cases (37 percent of the countries) an increase in aid is associated with an increase in GDP. Even 
within the country groups with negative and positive effects, the individual country estimates show 
considerable heterogeneity. For example, the point estimates suggest that Chile and Guatemala 
benefit markedly from aid (although both received quite small or negligible amounts of aid). In 
contrast, in many countries, such as Lesotho and Togo (both recipients of relatively large amounts 
of aid) both the positive and negative effects are marginal (close to 0), whereas in many other 
countries, such as Algeria (negligible aid) and Sierra Leone (large aid) aid has a strong negative 
effect on GDP. There is a tendency for the output response to be positive (negative) for countries 
receiving small (large) amounts of aid, but there are exceptions. 
In light of the finding that the effect of aid on GDP is not constant across countries, a natural 
question is whether it is constant over time. To answer this question, we compute for each country-
DOLS regression the MeanF test developed by Hansen (1992). This test is a Chow-type test for 
parameter constancy in cointegrating regressions with unknown change points and is designed to 
detect any gradual changes in the regression coefficients.
7 The results of this test are reported in 
columns 4 and 8 of Table 3. They show that the null hypothesis of parameter stability is rejected at 
least at the five percent level in about 20 percent of cases, suggesting that in some countries the 
effect of aid on GDP has changed over time. The most plausible explanation for this finding is that 
the effect of aid on GDP depends on political and institutional factors. If policies and institutions 
affecting the aid-output relationship change substantially over time, then also the effect of aid on 
output changes over time. The country-specific factors affecting the effect of aid on GDP are 
examined in the next section. 
 
5. Determinants of the Long-Run Effect of Aid on Output 
This section systematically searches for country-specific factors that help to explain the 
cross-country differences in the output effect of aid; that is, determinants of aid effectiveness. These 
determinants have been investigated by several studies using cross-country growth regressions, 
some including interaction terms between aid and a small number of potential determinants of aid 
                                                           
7 Hansen (1992) develops the stability tests using the FMOLS estimator. Because the DOLS estimator is asymptotically 
equivalent to the FMOLS estimator, the test statistics have the same distributions and are thus applicable to both 
estimators.   15
effectiveness. A limitation of the conventional interaction-term approach, however, is the inability 
to empirically identify which independent variable in the interaction term determines the effect of 
the other independent variable on the dependent variable. For example, a statistically significant 
interaction term between aid and economic policy does not necessarily imply that aid effectiveness 
depends on economic policy. A statistically significant aid-policy interaction term can also be 
compatible with the growth effect of economic policy being influenced by aid. A different approach 
employs cross-section regressions with the output effect of aid as the dependent variable to consider 
a large number of possible determinants of aid effectiveness. By including as many variables as 
possible relevant to aid effectiveness and using as the dependent variable the output effect of aid 
instead of output growth, the approach is less subject to omitted variable and endogeneity bias than 
the conventional interaction-term approach. 
The twenty variables considered to be potentially relevant to aid effectiveness are only 
summarized here; details and the country composition of the sample is in Appendix A4, with 
variables, definitions and sources in Appendix Table A6. As the economic policy index as used by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) may mask differences in the influence of the components, separate 
indicators of monetary policy, fiscal policy and trade policy are employed here: inflation, the budget 
balance and liberalization dates (the Sachs and Warner openness index) respectively. These are the 
‘policy’ variables. 
Political and institutional factors are likely to be important. The level of democracy is 
measured by the democracy index from the POLITY IV data base, with values from 0 (absence of 
democracy) to 10 (highest level of democracy), while political instability is measured as the number 
of revolutions and coups. The quality of institutions is obviously important but as different 
measures capture distinct features, several institutional variables from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) are included: Socioeconomic conditions, Investment profile, Internal conflict, 
External conflict, Corruption, (influence of the) Military in politics, Law and order, Religious and 
Ethnic tensions, and Bureaucratic quality. The indicators for corruption, internal conflict, external 
conflict, military in politics, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions are rescaled so that higher values 
always reflect higher institutional quality.  
A number of other factors are considered. Geographical or structural features are captured 
by the share of a country’s area that is in the tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004). The annual variability 
of aid may influence effectiveness, so aid uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of the 
residuals of a regression of aid (as a percentage of GDP) on two lags of aid, a constant term, and a 
linear time trend (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). GDP per capita is included as the marginal   16
effectiveness of aid may vary with income level (Gomanee et al., 2005a). As adverse effects of rent-
seeking or intervention may relate to government size the share of government consumption in GDP 
is included. Finally, absorptive capacity is measured by the secondary school enrolment rate.  
The dependent variable is the estimated long-run effect of aid on GDP from Table 3,  i β ˆ . As 
discussed in Section 4, this effect can be assumed to be time-constant in 80 percent of the countries 
in our sample and thus be treated as average impact per year. For the remaining 20 percent, the 
estimated output effect of aid is not constant; nevertheless, it can be interpreted as a time average 
over the period 1971-2003. Consequently, we also use time averages for the independent variables 
in that period. Unfortunately, however, we do not have complete data on all variables for all 
countries, limiting the sample to 45 countries.  
Given the large number of variables, all of which are potential determinants of aid 
effectiveness, we are confronted with the classical problem of variable selection — the problem of 
identifying those variables that are, in fact, important regressors for explaining the cross-country 
variations in the long-run effect of aid on GDP. To deal with this problem, we use the general-to-
specific variable selection approach suggested by Hoover and Perez (2004). Hoover and Perez show 
by means of Monte Carlo simulations that their approach is very effective in identifying the true 
parameters of the data generating process, outperforming other variable selection procedures such 
as the extreme bounds approaches of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
Following Hoover and Perez (2004), we start by estimating a general specification in which 
all variables are included, and simplify it by removing insignificant variables. The variables are first 
ranked according to their t-statistics,
8 then five simplification paths are applied in which each of the 
five variables with the lowest t-statistics is the first to be removed, yielding five equations. From 
these equations, variables with insignificant coefficients are then eliminated sequentially according 
to the lowest t-values until the remaining variables are significant at least at the 5% level. After 
removal of each variable, a battery of specification tests is performed, including a Jarque-Bera test 
(JB) for normality of the residuals, a Ramsey RESET test for general nonlinearity and functional 
form misspecification (RESET), and a sub-sample stability test (STABILITY) using an F-test for the 
equality of the variances of the residuals of sub-Saharan countries versus the rest of the sample. 
Furthermore, an F-test of the hypothesis that the current specification is a valid restriction of the 
general specification is used after each step (RESTRICTION). In our case, all of these tests are 
                                                           
8 Since an estimated dependent variable may introduce heteroskedasticity into the regressions (see Saxonhouse, 1976), 
we use White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors to compute the t-statistics. 
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passed, implying five well-specified parsimonious equations, which are all valid restrictions of the 
general model. Finally, we construct the non-redundant joint model from each of these equations by 
taking all specifications and performing the F-test for encompassing the other specifications. This 
procedure yields the final specification in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 General-to-specific approach: final specification 
Independent variables  Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Rel  0.0100** (2.93) 
Law  0.0137* (2.32) 
Size  -0.0025* (-2.04) 





(2))  0.61 [0.74] 
RESET (χ
2
(1))  0.12 [0.73] 
STABILITY F(24, 19) = 1.02 [0.97] 
RESTTRICTION  F(18, 24) = 0.88 [0.61] 
Notes: Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. ** (*) 
indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality, RESET is the usual test for general 
nonlinearity and misspecification, STABILITY is an F-test for the equality of the variances of sub-Saharan countries 
versus the rest of the sample, and RESTRICTION is an F-test of the hypothesis that the model is a valid restriction of the 
general model. Numbers in brackets behind the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the corresponding p-values. 
The sign of the coefficient on Rel is positive, since a higher number indicates lower religious tensions. 
 
The final model passes all the diagnostic tests. The assumption of normally distributed 
residuals cannot be rejected, and the Ramsey RESET test does not suggest nonlinearity or 
misspecification. The model also passes the F-test for parameter stability and the F-test that the 
final model is a valid restriction of the general model. In addition, the recursive residuals in Figure 
A5 persistently lie within the error bounds of –2 and +2 standard errors, suggesting that no outliers 
are present. Consequently, statistically valid inferences can be drawn from the results in Table 4. 
All coefficients have the expected sign: a higher level of law and order (Law) is associated 
with greater aid effectiveness whereas government size (Size) and religious tensions (Rel) are 
negatively related to the output effect of aid (the sign of the coefficient on Rel is positive as a higher 
number indicates lower religious tensions). The results suggest that cross-country variations in 
religious tensions, law and order, and government size are important factors in explaining the cross-
country differences in the long-run effect of aid on GDP. 
The output effect of aid appears not to depend (directly) on the quality of monetary policy 
(measured by inflation), fiscal policy (measured by the budget balance), trade policy (measured by 
the Sachs and Warner openness index), the share of a country’s area that is in the tropics, the level   18
of democracy, political instability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal and 
external conflicts, corruption, the influence of the military in politics, ethnic tensions, the 
institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, aid uncertainty, GDP per capita, and absorptive 
capacity (measured by the secondary school enrolment rate). All these variables turned out to be 
insignificant and hence were removed from the general model. 
  
Table 5 General specification and correlation coefficients 
Regressors  t-statistics  Correlation coefficients between the variables of the final model and each 
variable that was omitted from the final model (t-statistics) 
Rel   2.50*      
Law  1.91  Rel Law  Size 
Size  -1.89      
Inflation  0.75  0.23 (1.52)  -0.14 (-0.91)  -0.15 (-0.98) 
Budget  -0.54  0.12 (0.81)  0.25 (1.68)  -0.13 (0.83) 
Openness  -1.61  0.18 (1.18)  0.50** (3.76)  -0.26 (-1.74)  
Tropics  -1.01  0.26 (1.77)  -0.32* (-2.18)  -0.23 (-1.56) 
Demo  0.39  0.19 (1.26)  0.10 (0.64)  -0.10 (-0.64) 
Instability  -0.38  0.09 (0.59)  -0.30* (-2.09)  -0.15 (-0.10) 
Socio  1.18  0.06 (0.39)  0.53** (4.08)  0.01 (0.06) 
Invprof  0.16  0.23 (1.58)  0.49** (3.70)  0.04 (0.27) 
Intconf  -0.67  0.22 (1.48)  0.67** (5.97)  0.37* (2.63) 
Extconf  0.74  0.14 (0.94)  0.11 (0.75)  -0.10 (-0.64) 
Corr  -0.77  0.25 (1.70)  0.47** (3.50)  0.14 (0.91) 
Military  -0.54  0.31* (2.12)  0.39** (2.79)  0.25 (1.72) 
Ethnic  -0.94  0.29 (1.96)  0.40** (2.88)  0.20 (1.35) 
Bureau  0.55  0.04 (0.23)  0.51** (3.82)  0.07 (0.46) 
Uncertain  1.40  0.03 (0.20)  -0.18 (-1.19)  0.35* (2.44)  
GDPpc  0.13  0.34* (2.37)  0.19 (1.23)  -0.07 (-0.45) 
Capacity  0.12  0.15 (0.98)  0.18 (1.19)  -0.16 (-1.09) 
Diagnostic tests    
Adj. R
2 0.10   
JB (χ
2
(2))  3.30 [0.19]   
RESET (χ
2
(1))  0.49 [0.49]   
STABILITY  F(19, 24) = 1.30 [0.54]   
** (*) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. Reported t-statistics in the second column are based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality, RESET is the usual test for 
general nonlinearity and misspecification, STABILITY is an F-test for the equality of the variances of sub-Saharan 
countries versus the rest of the sample. Numbers in brackets behind the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the 
corresponding p-values. The indicators for corruption, internal conflict, external conflict, military in politics, religious 
tensions, and ethnic tensions are rescaled so that higher values always reflect higher institutional quality. 
 
Table 5 provides some information about the performance of these excluded variables. The 
second column reports the t-statistics of the variables of the final model and each variable that was 
omitted from the final specification — that is, we present the t-statistics of the variables of the 
general specification. The last three columns give an indication of the extent to which the omitted   19
variables are collinear with the regressors of the final model, showing the pair-wise correlation 
coefficients and their t-statistics.  
When all variables are included together in the regression, the statistical significance of the 
variables of the final model decreases (as expected), while several variables that were omitted from 
the final specification, such as openness (Openness), internal conflict (Intconf), and corruption 
(Corr), have the ‘wrong’ sign. This suggests that several of the omitted variables are correlated with 
the variables in the final model, in turn implying that some of the excluded variables might play an 
important indirect role in the aid-GDP relationship by affecting the included variables or being 
affected by them. The pair-wise correlation coefficients show that law and order is significantly 
correlated with many of the other variables: openness, the share of a country’s area that is in the 
tropics (Tropics), political instability (Instability), socioeconomic conditions (Socio), investment 
profile (Invprof), internal conflict, corruption, military in politics (Military), ethnic tensions 
(Ethnic), and bureaucratic quality (Bureau). Government size is positively correlated with internal 
conflict and aid uncertainty (Uncertain), while religious tension has positive correlations with GDP 
per capita (GDPpc) (implying higher values are associated with lower tension) and military in 
politics (which is rescaled, so less military involvement is associated with less tensions). 
Thus, the findings suggest that cross-country variations in the long-run effect of aid on GDP 
can be explained primarily by cross-country differences in religious tensions, law and order, and 
government size. However, this does not imply that all other variables are irrelevant for exploiting 
the potential of aid to increase domestic output. There are several factors — such as openness, 
political instability, and corruption — that are related to the direct determinants of the long-run 
effect of aid on GDP and thus are likely to play an important indirect role in the long-run 
relationship between aid and GDP.  
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper first examined the nature of the relationship between foreign aid and economic 
development using panel cointegration techniques designed to deal with problems plaguing 
previous cross-country studies on aid effectiveness: omitted variables, cross-country heterogeneity, 
endogeneity, and neglected long-run level relationships between foreign aid and domestic output. 
Employing data for 59 developing countries over the period 1971 to 2003, aid has, on average, a 
negative long-run effect on output. This finding is robust to potential outliers, sample selection, the 
specification of the empirical model, the sample period, and different estimation techniques.   20
Nevertheless, there are large differences in the long-run effect of aid on output across countries. 
More specifically, an increase in the aid/GDP ratio is associated with a long-run decrease in GDP in 
almost two-thirds of the countries, while in just over a third of the cases an increase in the aid share 
is associated with a long-run increase in GDP. In general, irrespective of the sign, the effect is 
small. As investment was found to have a significant positive effect on long-run GDP, it is possible 
that this captures any long-run positive effect of aid on GDP through financing investment (Lensink 
and Morrissey, 2000; Gomanee et al., 2005b). 
Using the estimated ‘output effect’ of aid for each country, a general-to-specific variable 
selection approach was then applied to identify important country-specific factors explaining the 
cross-country differences in the long-run effect of aid on output. In contrast to previous studies, the 
results suggest that aid effectiveness does not depend primarily on the quality of economic policy, 
location in the tropics, the level of democracy or corruption, political stability or absorptive 
capacity. Instead, the results suggest that the cross-country heterogeneity in the output effect of aid 
can be explained mainly, or most directly, by cross-country differences in law and order, religious 
tensions and government size. However, there are several factors — such as openness, location in 
the tropics, political instability, corruption, and bureaucratic accountability — that are highly 
correlated with law and order, religious tensions, and/or government size, suggesting these factors 
may play an indirect role in long-run effectiveness of aid. 
Of the three primary determinants of aid effectiveness religious tension has the most 
significant coefficient; aid appears to be more effective in countries with lower religious tension. 
The most significant correlates of religious tension are GDP per capita (higher income is associated 
with lower tension) and the role of the military in politics (less involvement is associated with less 
tension); interestingly, religious tension does not appear to be correlated with ethnic tension. It is 
unlikely to be religious tensions themselves that undermine aid effectiveness, but a combination of 
the three variables: in low income countries that are militarized and have religious tension aid is 
unlikely to contribute to output. To some extent donors show awareness of this, as they monitor the 
use of aid to ensure it is not diverted to support military spending. This provides a warning in 
countries where aid is being used to support the war on terror; aid is unlikely to impact on output 
where the primary concern is security. 
The finding that aid is less effective in countries with large consumption/GDP ratios, and 
that government size is positively correlated with internal conflict and aid uncertainty, supports 
arguments that governments with high levels of rent-seeking behavior are less likely to use aid 
effectively. Aid may induce self-interested individuals to engage in rent-seeking activities aimed at   21
appropriating part of any resource windfall, and, as a result, scarce resources are withdrawn from 
other productive activities, as several theoretical models predict (e.g. Hodler, 2007; Economides, 
2008). One reason is that revenues, including aid, are more likely to be diverted to consumption 
spending rather than public investment, limiting any increase in output. This adverse effect may be 
heightened in the presence of internal conflict: distributive conflicts, of which war is the extreme, 
diminish the productivity of an economy in a number of ways, such as by generating uncertainty in 
the economic environment and/or by destroying the economic and political institutions and 
infrastructure that facilitate an efficient allocation of resources. Furthermore, the instability 
associated with distributive conflicts may make aid receipts more volatile and the associated aid 
uncertainty is likely to have a greater impact on reducing investment spending than on consumption 
(Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). In these cases donors need to carefully monitor the use of aid to 
ensure that productive activities are supported with reliable flows of income. 
The analysis suggests that the most important variable capturing the quality of institutions is 
‘law and order’, including the rule of law and protection of property rights. It is worth emphasizing 
that this variable is significantly correlated with most of the explanatory variables included (10 of 
the 17 other measures); it can be interpreted as capturing the effect of institutions on productivity 
and hence on aid effectiveness. There are numerous channels through which these effects can 
operate, and causality should not be inferred. The correlates suggest that countries that are more 
open with lower tensions, lower conflict and better indicators of institutional quality will have 
higher values of law and order, and such countries are less likely to be in the tropics. Thus, 
measures that improve institutions are likely to enhance aid effectiveness, and a wide range of 
potential interventions, from policy to capacity-building, are included. 
A final conclusion is that the negative effect of aid found for many countries need not 
remain negative; it can become positive over time when certain country-specific factors determining 
the effect of aid change (i.e. are improved). Of these factors perhaps the most important is the 
quality of institutions. Institutions, especially enforcement of law and order (including property 
rights), can limit the appropriation of aid by rent seeking governments and thus ensure that aid is 
not wasted through profligate consumption but invested in productive activities. The results suggest 
a primacy of institutions over aid: a bad institutional environment not only depresses economic 
activity, as found in several studies, but also prevents aid from raising the standard of living. To 
improve aid effectiveness it is necessary to support institutional development, and there is evidence 
that this can be successful. 
   22
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., Ventura, J., 2002. The world income distribution. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 117, 659–994. 
Adam, C., O’Connell, S., 2004. Aid versus trade revisited: donor and recipient policies in the 
presence of learning-by-doing. The Economic Journal 114, 150–173. 
Almeida, R., Fernandes, A., 2008. Openness and technological innovations in developing countries: 
evidence from firm-level surveys. Journal of Development Studies 44, 701–727. 
Bräutigam, D.A., Knack, S., 2004. Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, 255–285. 
Breitung, J., 2005. A parametric approach to the estimation of cointegrating vectors in panel data. 
Econometric Reviews 24, 151–173. 
Burnside, C., Dollar, D., 2000. Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review 90, 847–868. 
Burnside, C., Dollar, D., 2004. Aid, policies, and growth: Revisiting the evidence. World Bank 
Policy Research Working No. 3251. 
Chauvet, L., Guillaumont, P., 2004. Aid and growth revisited: Policy, economic vulnerability, and 
political instability. In: Tungodden, B., Stern, N., Kolstad, I. (Eds.), Toward pro-poor policies. 
Aid, institutions, and globalization. Washington and New York: World Bank and Oxford 
University Press, 95–109. 
Collier, P., Dollar, D., 2002. Aid allocation and poverty reduction. European Economic Review 46, 
1475–1500. 
Collier, P., Dollar, D., 2004. Development effectiveness: what have we learnt? The Economic 
Journal 114, F244–F271. 
Commission for Africa 2005. Our common interest: report of the Commission for Africa. London: 
Commission for Africa. 
Daalgard, C.-H., Hansen, H., 2001. On aid, growth, and good policies. Journal of Development 
Studies 37, 17–41. 
Daalgard, C.-H., Hansen, H., Tarp, F., 2004. On the empirics of foreign aid and growth. Economic 
Journal 114, 191–216.   23
Easterly, W., Levine, R., Roodman, D., 2004. Aid policies and growth: comment, American 
Economic Review 94, 774–780. 
Economides, G., Kalyvitis, S., Phillippopoulos, A., 2008. Does foreign aid distort incentives and 
hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries. Public Choice 134, 463–488. 
Ericsson, N.R, Irons, J.S., Tryon. R.W., 2001. Output and inflation in the long-run. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 16, 241–253. 
Everhart, S.S. Sumlinski, M.A., 2001. Trends in private investment in developing countries, 
statistics for 1970 – 2000 and the impact on private investment of corruption and the quality of 
public investment. International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper No. 44, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
Gallup, J.L., Sachs, J.D., Mellinger, A.D., 1999. Geography and economic development. 
International Regional Science Review 22, 179–232. 
Gomanee, K., Girma, S., Morrissey, O., 2005a. Aid, Public Spending and Human Welfare: 
Evidence from Quantile Regressions. Journal of International Development 17, 299-309. 
Gomanee, K., Girma, S., Morrissey, O., 2005b. Aid and growth in sub-Saharan Africa: accounting 
for transmission mechanisms. Journal of International Development 17, 1055–1076. 
Hansen, B.E., 1992. Tests for parameter instability in regressions with I(1) processes. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 10, 321–35.  
Hansen, H., Tarp, F., 2000. Aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of International Development 12, 
375–398. 
Hansen, H., Tarp, F., 2001. Aid and growth regressions. Journal of Development Economics 64, 
547–570. 
Herzer, D., 2008. The long-run relationship between outward FDI and domestic output: Evidence 
from panel data. Economics Letters 100, 146–149. 
Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., 2006. Penn World Table Version 6.2. Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 
2006. 
Hodler, R., 2007. Rent seeking and aid effectiveness. International Tax and Public Finance 14, 
525–541.    24
Holly, S., Pesaran, M.H., Yamagata, T., 2009. A spatio-temporal model of house prices in the US. 
Journal of Econometrics (forthcoming). 
Hoover, K., Perez, S.J., 2004. Truth and robustness in cross-country growth regressions. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 66, 765–798. 
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y., 2003. Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal of 
Econometrics 115, 53–74. 
Islam, M.N., 2005. Regime changes, economic policies and the effect of aid on economic growth. 
Journal of Development Studies 41, 1467–1492. 
Johansen, S., 1988. Statistical analysis of cointegrating vectors. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 12, 231–254. 
Kosack, S., 2003. Effective aid: How democracy allows development aid to improve the quality of 
live. World Development 31, 1–22. 
Larsson, R., Lyhagen, J., Löthegren, M., 2001. Likelihood-based cointegration tests in 
heterogeneous panels. Econometrics Journal 4, 109–142. 
Lensink, R., Morrissey, O., 2000. Aid instability as a measure of uncertainty and the positive 
impact of aid on growth. Journal of Development Studies 36, 31–49. 
Levine, R.E., Renelt., D., 1992. A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions. 
American Economic Review 82, 942–963. 
McGillvary, M., Morrissey, O., 2004. Fiscal effects of aid. In: Addison, T., Roe, A. (Eds.), Fiscal 
policy for development: Poverty, Reconstruction, and Growth. Palgrave Macmillan for UNU-
Wider: Basingstoke, 72–96.  
Maren, M., 1997. The road to hell: The Ravaging effects of foreign aid and international charity. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Morrissey, O., 2006. Aid or trade, or aid and trade? The Australian Economic Review 39, 78–88. 
Pedroni, P., 1999. Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with multiple 
regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 653–670. 
Pedroni, P., 2000. Fully modified OLS for heterogeneous cointegrated panels. Advances in 
Econometrics 15, 93–130. 
Pedroni, P., 2001. Purchasing power parity tests in cointegrated panels. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 83, 727–731.   25
Pedroni, P., 2004. Panel cointegration: Asymptotic and finite sample properties of pooled time 
series tests with an application to the PPP hypothesis. Econometric Theory 20, 597–625. 
Pesaran, M.H. 2006. Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a multifactor 
error structure. Econometrica 74, 967–1012. 
Pesaran, M.H., 2007. A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-section dependence. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 22, 265–312. 
Pesaran, M.H., Smith, R., 1995. Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of Econometrics 68, 79–113. 
Rajan, R.R., Subramanian, A., 2007. Does aid affect governance? American Economic Review 97, 
322–327. 
Rajan, R.R., Subramanian, A., 2008. Aid and growth: what does the cross-country evidence really 
show? The Review of Economics and Statistics 90, 643–665.  
Reinsel, G.C., Ahn, S.K., 1992. Vector autoregressive models with unit roots and reduced rank 
structure: estimation, likelihood ratio test and forecasting. Journal of Time Series Analysis 
13, 353–375.  
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A., 1995. Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1–118. 
Sala-I-Martin, X.X., 1997. I just ran two million regressions. American Economic Review 87, 178–
183. 
Saxonhouse, G., 1976. Estimated parameters as dependent variables. American Economic Review 
66, 178–183. 
Singh, R.D., 1985. State intervention, foreign economic aid, savings and Growth in LDCs: some 
recent evidence. Kyklos 38, 216–232. 
Svensson, J., 1999. Aid, growth and democracy. Economics and Politics 11, 275–297. 
Stock, J.H., Watson, M.W., 1993. A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher-order 
integrated systems. Econometrica 61, 783–820. 
Temple, J., 1999. The new growth evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 37, 112–156. 
Wacziarg, R., Welch, K.H., 2008. Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence. World Bank 
Economic Review 22, 187–231. 
   26
Appendix A1 Panel unit-root tests  
To examine the time series properties of the data, we use the panel unit root test of Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS), which is based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression 








1 ' ,                                                                                 (A.1) 
where pi is the lag order and zit represents deterministic terms, such as fixed effects or fixed effects 
combined with individual time trends. The IPS test tests the null hypothesis of a unit root for all i, 
0 : 0 = i H ρ , against the alternative of (trend) stationary,  0 : 1 < i H ρ ,  i  = 1, 2, …,  1 N ; 0 = i ρ , 
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where  NT t   is the average of the N (= 59) cross-section ADF t-statistics, and μ and ν are, 
respectively, the mean and variance of the average of the individual t-statistics, tabulated by Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003).  
However, the standard IPS test can lead to spurious inferences if the errors, εit, are not 
independent across i  — for example, due to common shocks or spillovers between countries. 
Therefore, we also employ the cross-section augmented IPS test proposed by Pesaran (2007), which 
is designed to filter out the cross-section dependency by augmenting the ADF regression with the 
cross-section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series. Accordingly, 
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where  t x  is the cross-section mean of xit,  t x  =  ∑ =
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i it x N
1
1 . The cross-section augmented IPS 
statistic is the simple average of the individual CADF statistics and is defined as 
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where  i t  is the OLS t-ratio of  i ρ  in Equation (A.3). Critical values are tabulated by Pesaran (2007).     27
The test results for the variables in levels and in first differences are presented in Table A1 
Both the IPS and the CIPS test statistics are unable to reject the hypothesis that all countries have a 
unit root in levels. Since the unit root hypothesis can be clearly rejected for the first differences, it 
can be concluded that Yit, Iit, and Ait are integrated of order one, I(1).  
 
Table A1 Panel unit root tests  
Variables Deterministic  terms
 
 
IPS statistics  CIPS statistics
 
 
Levels      
Yit c , t -1.36  -2.01 
Iit c , t -0.76  -2.49 
Ait  c, t  0.51 -1.94 
 
First differences 
   
ΔYit  c  -9.56** -2.47** 
ΔIit  c  -12.79** -3.02** 
ΔAit  c -12.79**  -2.74** 
Notes: c (t) indicates that we allow for different intercepts (and time trends) for each country. Three lags were selected 
to adjust for autocorrelation. The IPS statistic is distributed as N(0, 1). The relevant 1% (5%) critical value for the CIPS 
statistics is -2.73 (-2.61) with an intercept and a linear trend, and -2.23 (-2.11) with an intercept.** denote significance 
at the 1% level. 
 
To select a panel of countries for which  it A , it I , and  it Y  behave as random walks, those 
countries for which the individual time series do not pass a screening for a unit root via the ADF 
and the KPSS tests were eliminated. This sample selection procedure yields a sample of 59 
countries ( 59 = N ) from 66 countries for which data on all variables are available from 1971 to 
2003 ( 33 = T ). The excluded countries are Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, and Venezuela, since the unit root-tests suggest that aid is stationary and the log of 
GDP of these countries behaves like a random walk. 
 
Appendix A2 Cointegration tests 
We first test for cointegration using the Larsson et al. (2001) approach, which is based on 
Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Like the Johansen time series 
cointegration test, the Larsson et al. panel test treats all variables as potentially endogenous, thus 
avoiding the normalization problems inherent in residual-based cointegration tests. Moreover, in 
contrast to residual-based cointgration tests, the Larsson et al. procedure allows the determination of 
the number of cointegrating vectors. It involves estimating the Johansen vector error-correction 
model for each country separately and then computing the individual trace statistics   28
} ) ( ) ( { p H r H LRiT . The null hypothesis is that all of the N countries in the panel have a common 
cointegrating rank, i.e. at most r (possibly heterogeneous) cointegrating relationships among the p 
(= 3) variables: 
r r rank H i i ≤ = Π ) ( : 0           for all  N i , ... , 1 = ,                                                               (A.5) 
whereas the alternative hypothesis is that all the cross-sections have a higher rank: 
p rank H i = Π ) ( : 1                 for all  N i , ... , 1 = ,                                                                (A.6) 
where  i Π is the long-run matrix of order p×p. To test  0 H  against  1 H , a panel cointegration rank 
trace test statistic is computed by calculating the average of the individual trace statistics: 
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and then standardizing it as follows:  
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where the mean  ) ( k Z E and variance  ) ( k Z Var  of the asymptotic trace statistic are tabulated by 
Breitung (2005) for the model we use — the model with a constant and a trend in the cointegrating 
relationship.  
However, the Johansen trace statistics are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis in 
small samples. To avoid the Larsson et al. test, as a consequence of this bias, also overestimating 
the cointegrating rank, we compute the standardized panel trace statistics based on small-sample 
corrected country-specific trace statistics. Specifically, we use the small-sample correction factor 
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where ki is the lag length of the models used in the test.  
A potential problem with Larsson et al. approach, however, is that it does not take into 
account potential error cross-sectional dependence, which could bias the results. To test for 
cointegration in the presence of possible cross-sectional dependence we follow Holly et al. (2009) 
and adopt a residual-based two-step approach in the style of Pedroni (1999). Unlike Pedroni, we use 
the common correlated effects (CCE) estimation procedure developed by Pesaran (2006) in the   29
first-step regression. This procedure allows for cross-section dependencies that potentially arise 
from multiple unobserved common factors by augmenting the cointegrating regression with the 
cross-section averages of the dependent variable and the observed regressors as proxies for the 
unobserved factors. Accordingly, the cross-section augmented cointegrating regression we estimate 
for each country is given by 
it t i t i t i it i it i i i it e I g A g Y g I A t a Y + + + + + + + = 3 2 1 2 1 β β δ ,                                               (A.10) 
where  t Y ,  t A , and  t I  are the cross-section averages of  it Y ,  it A , and  it I  in year t. In the second step, 
we compute the cross-section augmented IPS statistic for the residuals from the individual CCE 
long-run relations,  it i it i i it it I A t Y 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ β β δ μ − − − = , including an intercept. Thus, we account for 
unobserved common factors that could be correlated with the observed regressors in both steps. 
The results of these tests are presented in Table A2. For completeness, we also report the 
standard panel and group ADF and PP test statistics suggested by Pedroni (1999, 2004). As can be 
seen, all tests strongly suggest that  it Y ,  it A , and  it I  are cointegrated. The standardized trace 
statistics clearly support the presence of one cointegrating vector. Also, the CIPS, the ADF, and the 
PP statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 5% level, implying that 
there exists a long-run relationship between output, aid, and investment. 
 
Table A2 Panel cointegration tests 
 Cointegration  rank 
  r = 0  r = 1  r = 2 
Panel trace statistics  9.43**  0.22  -2.52 
CIPS statistic  -3.00** 
Panel ADF statistic  -3.78** 
Group ADF statistic  -3.05** 
Panel PP statistic  -3.18** 
Group PP statistic  -2.07* 
Notes: ** (*) indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% (5%) level. The panel trace 
statistics, the ADF statistics, and the PP statistics are asymptotically normally distributed. The relevant 5% (1%) critical 
value for the CIPS statistic is -2.11 (-2.23). The number of lags was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a 
maximum number of three lags. The panel statistics pool the autoregressive coefficients across different countries 
during the unit root test on the residuals of the static cointegrating regressions, whereas the group statistics are based on 
averaging the individually estimated autoregressive coefficients for each country. The panel ADF statistic is analogous 
to the Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test. The group ADF statistic is analogous to the IPS panel unit root test. The 
PP statistics are panel versions of the Phillips-Perron (PP) t-statistics. 
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Appendix A3 Sensitivity results for long-run estimates 
To verify that the negative effect of aid on output is not due to individual outliers the DOLS 
regression (with demeaned data to account for the likely cross-sectional dependence through 
common time effects)
9 is re-estimated excluding one country at a time from the sample. The 
sequentially estimated group-mean coefficients and their t-statistics are presented in Figure A4. As 
they are relatively stable between -0.0095 and -0.007 and always significant at the one percent 
level, we conclude that the average negative effect is not the result of individual outliers. 
 






Number of countries in 
the sample 
Excluding North Africa  -0.0064** (-8.07)  0.0162** (14.78)  55 
Excluding sub-Saharan Africa  -0.0092** (-7.65)  0.0218** (14.77)  29 
Excluding South America  -0.0084** (-9.91)  0.0154** (14.12)  54 
Excluding Central America and the Caribbean  -0.0068** (-7.62)  0.0148** (13.25)  50 
Excluding East Asia  -0.0096** (-10.26)  0.0189** (14.75)  51 
Excluding South Asia and the Middle East  -0.0080** (-8.56)  0.0164** (14.29)  55 
** indicate significance at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. The countries included in each region are: North 
Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco; sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe; South America: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay; Central America and 
the Caribbean: Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, 
Panama; East Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Thailand; 
South Asia and the Middle East: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria 
 
The negative long-run relationship between aid and GDP may be due to sample-selection 
bias if a group of countries in a particular region have a significant effect on the results. To 
investigate this equation (4) is re-estimated excluding (in turn) countries from North Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa, South America, Central America and the Caribbean, East Asia, and South Asia and 
the Middle East. The resulting group-mean values for β1 (and β2) are reported in Table A3. 
Regardless of which of these regions is excluded from the sample, the long-run relationship 
between aid and GDP remains negative and highly significant. From this, it can be concluded that 
the estimates do not suffer from sample selection-bias. Another conclusion that can be drawn from 
the results is that the effect of aid on GDP is not lower in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other 
regions; estimating the output effect for sub-Saharan Africa separately, the DOLS group-mean 
value is -0.0070 (with a t-value of -5.63), which is very close to the result for the total sample (-
0.0081).   31
A potential specification problem is that the estimates may be biased if the investment 
variable includes public investment that is aid-financed. In this case, the estimated β1 coefficient 
would not capture the share of aid that is used for public investment purposes and thus 
underestimates the true effect of aid on GDP. To investigate this the DOLS regression is estimated 
with private investment data in place of total investment. The data on private investment (as a share 
of GDP) are from the International Finance Corporation’s Trends in private investment in 
developing countries, authored by Everhart and Sumlinski (2001). Unfortunately, these data are 
available only for 18 of the 59 countries of our sample over a sufficiently long period of time (25 
years from 1975 to 1999).
10 Nevertheless, the long-run effect of aid on GDP remains negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, as the results in Table A4 show.  
 
Table A4 DOLS estimates of the coefficients on aid and private investment 
Ait  Iprivateit 
-0.0138** (-3.71)  0.0230** (9.64) 
Notes: The dependent variable is Yit. ** indicate significance at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. The individual 
DOLS regressions were estimated with one lead and one lag. The sample period is 1975 -1999 and the number of 
countries in the sample is 18.  
 
To check whether the results are sensitive to the sample period the DOLS regression is re-
estimated for the sub-periods from 1971 through 1995 and 1979 through 2003. The results are 
presented in Table A5. Once again, the coefficient on Ait is always negative and statistically 
significant. 
 
Table A5 DOLS estimation for different sub-periods 
  Ait  Iit 
1971-1995 -0.0072**  (-6.56)  0.0191**  (16.42) 
1979-2003 -0.0088**  (-9.57)  0.0168**  (12.96) 
The dependent variable is Yit. ** indicate significance at the 1% level. t-statistics in parentheses. The individual DOLS 
regressions were estimated with one lead and one lag. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 In the following, we use the demeaned data to account for the likely cross-sectional dependence through common time 
effects. 
10 We include all countries of our sample for which continuous private investment data are available from 1975 to 1999. 
These countries are: Belize, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay. The data have been 
demeaned with respect to common time effects. 
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Appendix A4 Data and sample for determinants of aid impact 
Data 
Twenty variables are considered potentially relevant to aid effectiveness; their definitions 
and sources are listed in Table A6 below. The quality of economic policy in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) is measured by a weighted average of inflation, the budget balance as a share of GDP, and 
the Sachs and Warner openness index. As this aggregate policy index may, however, mask potential 
differences in the influence of monetary policy, fiscal policy, and trade policy on aid effectiveness, 
the individual components of the policy index are included separately in the analysis. The Sachs and 
Warner openness index is constructed on the basis of the liberalization dates provided by Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Data on inflation and the budget balance are from 
the World Development Indicators. 
The fourth variable is the share of a country’s area that is in the tropics. Dalgaard et al. 
(2004), for example, find that the effect of aid on economic growth is negatively associated with the 
fraction of a country that is located in the tropics, and offer two possible explanations. First, tropical 
countries tend to grow slower than countries with a more temperate climate because of lower 
agricultural productivity and the high prevalence of diseases (such as AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis). For the same reasons, the effect of aid on growth tends to be stronger in countries 
with a temperate climate than in tropical countries, implying that aid effectiveness depends directly 
on the climate. Second, climatic circumstances may have influenced the evolution of other slow-
changing characteristics, like institutions. Thus, the fraction of tropical area may be seen as a rough 
indicator for institutional quality in the broadest sense, and aid effectiveness depends indirectly on 
institutional quality.  The variable used is the percentage of land area in the tropics from Gallup et 
al. (1999) (available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata). 
The long-run effect of aid on GDP may depend on the level of democratization. Svensson 
(1999) argues that democratic institutions (such as political parties, elected representatives, free 
speech) provide a recurrent and institutionalized check on governments, forcing them to use aid for 
productive purposes rather than for unproductive government consumption, and finds that the effect 
of aid on growth is stronger for countries with higher democracy scores. Similarly, the empirical 
results in Kosack (2003) suggest that the effect of aid on the quality of life (measured by the Human 
Development Index) is positively related to the level of democracy; democracy is measured by the 
democracy index from the POLITY IV data base, with values from 0 (absence of democracy) to 10 
(highest level of democracy) (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).   33
A measure of political instability is used to capture the idea that in a troubled environment, 
with violent conflicts and frequently changing governments, aid is less effective. Chauvet and 
Guillaumont (2004) and Islam (2005) find that the growth effect of aid is negatively associated with 
political instability. The variable used is the number of revolutions and coups, calculated from the 
Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm) on the basis of Coups 
d’état data.  
 
Table A6 Variables and sources for determinants of aid effect 
Variables Definition  Source 
Inflation  Percentage change in the consumer prices. Data averaged over the 
period 1971 to 2003. 
World Development 
Indicators 2009 
Budget  Overall budget balance as a percentage of GDP. Data averaged over 
the period 1971 to 2002.  
World Development 
Indicators 2004 
Openness  Sachs and Warner openness index. Data averaged over the period 
1971 to 2003. 
Sachs and Warner (1995); 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008) 
Tropics  The share of a country’s area that is in the tropics.   Gallup et al. (1999); 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/c
iddata/ciddata 
Demo  Democracy. Data averaged over the period 1971 to 2003.  POLITY IV; 
http://www.systemicpeace.or
g/polity/polity4.htm 
Instability  Political instability. Measured by the number of revolutions and coups. 
Data averaged over the period 1971 to 2003. 
Center for Systemic Peace; 
http://www.systemicpeace.or
g/inscr/inscr.htm 
Socio  Socioeconomic conditions. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 
2003. 
Political Risk Services Group
Invprof  Investment profile. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Intconf  Internal conflict. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Extconf  External conflict. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Corr  Corruption. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Military  Military in politics. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Rel  Religious tensions. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Law  Law and order. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Ethnic  Ethnic tensions. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Bureau  Bureaucratic quality. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  Political Risk Services Group
Uncertain  Aid uncertainty. Measured by the standard deviation of the residuals of 
a regression of aid (as a percentage of GDP) on two lags of aid, a 




GDPpc  Real per capita GDP in constant 2000 US dollars. Data averaged over 
the period 1971 to 2003. 
World Development 
Indicators 2009 
Size  Government size. Measured by the share of general government 
consumption in GDP. Data averaged over the period 1971 to 2003. 
World Development 
Indicators 2009 
Capacity  Absorptive capacity. Measured by the secondary school enrolment rate. 




variable:  i β ˆ
 
Long-run effect of aid on GDP. Individual DOLS estimates of the 
coefficient on Ait over the period 1971 to 2003. 
Table 6 
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The long-run output effect of aid will depend on the quality of institutions (in ways that may 
not be captured by the measures already discussed). Institutions lower transaction costs by reducing 
uncertainty and establishing a stable economic structure to facilitate interactions, thus helping to 
allocate resources to their most efficient uses. Without institutions, both individuals and 
governments do not have incentives to invest in physical or human capital or adopt more efficient 
technologies, implying that resources are misallocated and opportunities for efficient use of aid go 
unexploited. Among the few studies addressing this issue, Burnside and Dollar (2004) find evidence 
that the growth effect of aid and institutional quality are positively related, whereas the results in 
Collier and Dollar (2002) surprisingly suggest that the relationship between the growth effect of aid 
and institutional quality is negative (although only significant at the 10% level). Both employ a 
single composite measure of institutional quality. It may be useful to consider several aspects of 
institutional quality to identify those institutional factors that are most important for aid 
effectiveness. Several institutional variables are available from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), published by the Political Risk Services Group.
11 They are defined as follows:   
•  Socioeconomic conditions –– this index quantifies socioeconomic pressures at work in society 
that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction and thus de-stabilize the 
political regime. 
•  Investment profile –– this measure assesses the factors affecting the risk to investment that are 
not covered by other political, economic or financial risk components, such as contract viability 
or payment delays. 
•  Internal conflict –– the internal conflict measure is an assessment of political violence within a 
country (such as civil war, terrorism, or civil disorder) and its actual or potential impact on 
governance. 
•  External conflict –– the external conflict measure assesses the risk to the incumbent government 
from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure to violent external pressure. 
•  Corruption –– this index assesses the level of corruption within the political system. 
•  Military in politics –– this measure assesses the influence of the military in politics. 
•  Religious tensions –– this is a measure of the extent to which society and/or governance is 
dominated by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to 
exclude other religions from the political and social process.   
                                                           
11 See https://www.prsgroup.com/prsgroup_shoppingcart/pc-75-7-icrg-historical-data.aspx   35
•  Law and order –– this index assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system and 
popular observance of the law.  
•  Ethnic tensions –– this measure is an assessment of the degree of tensions within a country 
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  
•  Bureaucratic quality –– this is an assessment of the institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy in terms of acting as a shock absorber to minimize revisions of policy when 
governments change.  
It is important to note that the indicators for corruption, internal conflict, external conflict, military 
in politics, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions are rescaled so that higher values always reflect 
higher institutional quality.
12  
Aid uncertainty is a possible determinant of the long-run effect of aid on GDP. If aid 
receipts are observed to vary significantly from year to year (aid uncertainty), whether due to 
macroeconomic uncertainty (aid responding to shocks), disbursement (donor) or absorption 
(recipient) difficulties, this can undermine budget and economic planning and reduce the quantity, 
as well as efficiency, of domestic investment. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) find that aid 
uncertainty has a negative effect on economic growth, although aid itself has a positive effect, 
which could suggest that the effectiveness of aid is reduced by increased aid uncertainty. Following 
Lensink and Morrissey (2000), aid uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of the 
residuals of a regression of aid (as a percentage of GDP) on two lags of aid, a constant term, and a 
linear time trend. Data on aid come from the World Development Indicators (as noted in Section 3). 
GDP per capita might be important for explaining cross-country differences in the output 
effect of aid to the extent that aid tends to decline as GDP rises, implying that the marginal 
effectiveness of aid is highest in low-income countries. Gomanee et al. (2005a) find that the effect 
of aid on welfare (measured by the Human Development Index and the infant mortality rate) is 
higher for low-income countries. Data on real per capita GDP are taken from World Development 
Indicators. 
Government size may be a factor in explaining the cross-country differences in the output 
effect of aid. Economides et al. (2008) develop a growth model in which aid promotes rent-seeking 
behavior at the expense of productive government activities, and the rent-seeking effect — and thus 
the growth effect of aid — depends on both the amount of aid and the size of the recipients   36
country’s public sector. The rationale for the latter is that rent seeking triggered by aid transfers 
takes place via state coffers, and this process is facilitated when the size of the public sector is large. 
Moreover, large government size may be associated with more regulation and government 
intervention, and this may also reduce the effectiveness of aid, as suggested by Singh (1985). 
Empirical support for this hypothesis is provided by Economides et al. (2008), who find that the 
growth effect of aid is larger for countries with small public sectors. Following common practice, 
government size is measured by the share of government consumption in GDP (from World 
Development Indicators). 
Finally, the long-run effect of aid on GDP is likely to depend on the ‘absorptive capacity’ of 
a country (Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004). Absorptive capacity is here measured by the secondary 
school enrolment rate from World Development Indicators. 
 
Sample of countries used in the analysis of the determinants of aid effectiveness 
Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 The democratic accountability index from ICRG has been excluded, since we have chosen to use the democracy 
index from Polity IV, as in Kosack (2003). Moreover, we do not include the government stability index from ICRG, 
since we measure political and thus government instability by the number of the number of revolutions and coups.   37
Figure A1 Log of GDP by country over the period 1971-2003, Yit  
 
Notes: The countries from the left to the right are: Algeria, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
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Figure A2 Aid/GDP ratio by country over the period 1971-2003, Ait   
 
Notes: The countries from the left to the right are: Algeria, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
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Figure A3 Investment/GDP ratio by country over the period 1971-2003, Iit  
 
Notes: The countries from the left to the right are: Algeria, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
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